1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
Akira encrypted shared folders in a September Windows-domain intrusion investigated by Huntress. Its EDR agent arrived after the compromise and alerted on svchost.exe running from C:\PerfLogs\Temp on a domain controller. The earlier ransomware execution emerged from three surviving artifacts: Registry Shellbags showing visits to subfolders under Shares, Akira logs naming the target share, and concurrent PowerShell events recording shadow-copy removal. Huntress observed that sequence four times, with the attacker revisiting folders after encryption activity.
Start with the RDP session from the unknown workstation C1IFRYXI and Service Control Manager event 7036 for stopped Bitdefender services. Preserve Windows event logs, Registry hives and Akira logs before changing the host. Search for executables launched from C:\PerfLogs, including the GOST tunnel file C:\PerfLogs\temp\svchost.exe; correlate traffic to its listed C2 address 64.227.4[.]134 and review Rclone outbound transfers. The GOST SHA-256 is d00833318a04caa019c6f95dcb3598ad947d405010bfb2f3cbd04530a00bc3a4; the ransomware at C:\storage\win.exe is 1f1bb322591b6d27fd2946e373d7d2efc2f4e1e66818846060d391600b600fba.
Restrict exposed RDP and enforce MFA. Confirm the unknown session has ended, antivirus services are running, and no tunnel process remains. Keep the historical artifact timeline alongside the new EDR telemetry: the agent’s first alert came after the attack began.