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Amazon Q Ran MCP Commands Supplied by Project Repositories

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

CVE-2026-12957 allowed project configuration to launch MCP commands through Amazon Q Developer. Wiz found that a repository’s .amazonq/mcp.json could start a local process with the developer’s full environment. Its proof of concept used the active AWS CLI context and sent the result of sts get-caller-identity to an external test endpoint.

AWS says the flaw affected Language Servers for AWS before 1.65.0. Its June bulletin recommends version 1.69.0 because that release also fixes CVE-2026-12958. AWS and Wiz describe the workspace-trust prompt differently, so responders should retain the IDE version, extension version and trust state when reconstructing exposure.

Verify the installed Amazon Q plugin and language-server versions, especially where proxies or offline workflows may block automatic updates. Search repositories and workstations for .amazonq/mcp.json, then review every command and environment entry. Limit production cloud authority in ambient environment variables.

For systems that ran a vulnerable version, inspect endpoint telemetry for MCP processes launched by the IDE and review cloud audit logs for activity from developer identities. Rotate any long-lived credentials that may have reached the process. Future MCP launches should show the source file, exact command and working directory before approval.

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