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What a defender needs to know
Kaspersky traced the first documented malware chain delivered to Android-based car head units through an automatic firmware-update service. The legitimate TWCore updater on DoFun-powered displays installed the invisible JarService dropper, which loaded later stages for ad fraud and a residential proxy botnet. Kaspersky attributes the activity to MoYu Group with high confidence.
The report does not establish compromise of vehicle safety systems or quantify infections. DoFun told Kaspersky it fixed the security issues, but neither company published an affected-version range, fixed firmware build, or supersession chain.
Inventory DoFun firmware and TWCore deployments. Preserve updater versions, APK signing certificates, installed packages, and installation timestamps. Hunt for JarService, com.miyc.transfer.Client, the defanged MoYu infrastructure in the primary reports, and unexpected outbound TCP 9999, 7777, or 5555 sessions from infotainment networks.
Reimage one representative device for every model and firmware combination from a supplier-approved source, apply the supported updater, and capture a complete isolated update cycle. The expected result is a package inventory containing only approved signed packages, no JarService or zhima class, and no network connection to the published MoYu indicators or proxy-relay ports.