1-minute read of a 5 min report

Poisoned AsyncAPI Packages Ran Code When Developers Imported Them

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

Five malicious AsyncAPI releases published on July 14, 2026 executed when normal code imported them. They avoided npm lifecycle hooks, so blocking install scripts would not have stopped the attack. The affected generator, helper, component and specification packages launched a detached node -e process that retrieved sync.js from IPFS. Socket identified the downloaded payload as a Miasma-family tasking framework with working file, shell, update and persistence functions.

The releases were published through AsyncAPI’s legitimate GitHub Actions workflow with valid provenance. Investigators traced the generator packages to a poisoned commit on the next branch. The provenance helped identify the source and workflow, but it did not establish maintainer intent.

Search lockfiles and caches for the five affected versions, then determine whether any build, test, generator or application path loaded them. If execution cannot be excluded, investigate or rebuild the host and rotate the credentials available to that process. Hunt for background Node.js children, unexpected IPFS traffic, sync.js, .miasma state and miasma-monitor.service. Protect publishable branches and require review through the release environment.

Primary sources