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Leaked AWS Administrator Key Funds Unauthorized AI Model Access

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What a defender needs to know

FortiGuard Labs investigated one AWS account where a leaked, long-lived IAM key with AdministratorAccess was used to create a new IAM user, accept foundation-model agreements through AWS Marketplace, and invoke paid models through Amazon Bedrock. The source did not identify the victim, report the incident’s charges, or quantify other victims of this specific chain.

CloudTrail can connect identity creation, credential changes, and the Marketplace operations CreateAgreementRequest and AcceptAgreementRequest on agreement-marketplace.amazonaws.com. Bedrock invocation logging adds request-level detail, but it is off by default. First-time Bedrock use needs corroboration from a new identity, unfamiliar source IP address, enumeration, access-denied noise, or an unexpected agreement.

Begin preserving the exposed principal’s CloudTrail history and immediately rotate or revoke the key. Account for every user, role, policy attachment, access key, Bedrock service-specific credential, Marketplace agreement, and model call it created or touched. Correlate that sequence with Bedrock invocation logs; every resulting identity, credential, agreement, and call should have a documented owner and business purpose or a completed remediation record.

Replace long-lived broad-scope keys with short-lived assumed-role credentials where possible. Enable organization-wide CloudTrail, turn on Bedrock invocation logging, and alert on new Marketplace agreements or service-specific credentials in accounts without approved AI workloads.

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