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ARMORY CASTLE Uses BeyondTrust Zero-Day to Keep Root Access

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What a defender needs to know

ARMORY CASTLE used a BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day, CVE-2026-102764, in late August. Mandiant observed a SAWFLY webshell, a root-owned SUID shell copy at /usr/bin/dbus-authd, a boot script granting passwordless root, a BARECLAW tunnel routed through the appliance’s HAProxy, and Remote Support sessions to internal endpoints. The actor changed Jump Item roles from No Access to Administrator and transferred files from a managed desktop. The affected supported versions run through 26.2.3 in BeyondTrust’s CVE record.

Patch self-hosted Remote Support 24.3.1 or later with BT26-05-RS through /appliance; older installations need a supported-version upgrade and the patch. Google reports that BeyondTrust patched SaaS tenants on October 9. Check the installed patch state, then examine forwarded syslog user_changed events, session and file-transfer reports, and reverse-proxy requests for /uidchanarge or unexpected .php paths. Local logs can have gaps because the actor deleted them.

For suspected host compromise, preserve a virtual appliance’s memory and disk, collect perimeter logs, and arrange forensic preservation through BeyondTrust Support for hardware or SaaS. Isolate suspect appliances at the perimeter. Rebuild confirmed or uncertain compromised hosts from a clean patched image, have BeyondTrust Support or a forensic team with appliance-host access check the preserved image for startup, sudoers-template and HAProxy changes against a pre-window baseline, and rotate appliance, API, vault and target-system credentials after securing the host. Check the managed endpoints reached during the exposure window; patching alone leaves an established foothold and downstream access unaddressed.

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