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What a defender needs to know
CloudSEK’s vendor research says the BigBear 2.0 phishing service captured 474 authenticated Microsoft 365 sessions after users completed MFA. The panel data showed at least one completed MFA-bypass compromise at 258 organizations, while 461 organizations appeared in its broader targeting dataset.
BigBear relayed the real Microsoft sign-in, captured the resulting session cookie and replayed it for account access. Its custom JavaScript tried to suppress FIDO2 or WebAuthn so victims would select a phishable factor. Country-matched residential proxies attempted to reduce location anomalies.
Match x-evg-token, x-evg-server, x-evg-session, evginx_session, evginx_token, evginx_admin, bigbear_session and bigbear_token in web or proxy telemetry. Search identity and network records for konceptenterprises[.]com, dnsforward[.]com, dataclust[.]com, offtic[.]com, annastudios-paros[.]com, cifutura[.]com, soil-management[.]com, kgsscans[.]com, hoaivt[.]com and dronalms[.]com.
Reset affected passwords, revoke active sessions and refresh tokens, then force reauthentication. Require origin-bound FIDO2 or WebAuthn and use Conditional Access to require a compliant, managed device. Verify from a fresh browser that every pre-response session fails and the account must authenticate again with the enforced phishing-resistant method.