1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
Google Threat Intelligence Group says BREEZE COMET moved from compromised endpoints into Brazilian payment infrastructure. Mandiant tied privileged access to core financial applications to two waves of hundreds of fraudulent transactions within 24 to 48 hours. The actor targets banks, payment processors, retailers, exchanges, fintechs and banking-software providers that can reach Pix, STR and Boleto workflows.
Entry paths included IT-support voice phishing, password spraying, compromised municipal websites, vulnerable JBoss servers and rogue hardware attached inside retail networks. The group then searched CI/CD, cloud and host environments for pipeline credentials, API keys, mTLS certificates and payment-related artifacts. COBALTSPIN tunneled traffic toward financial APIs while LIGHTPAINT, MILDFROST, KICKPLATE and BOATBEAM preserved redundant access.
Search endpoint and network telemetry for the published malware hashes, DnsCommandBeacon.class, unexpected RMM execution, new services, SYSTEM scheduled tasks, WebSocket SOCKS5 traffic and PowerShell event 4104. Inspect PowerShell records for Set-MpPreference setting DisableRealtimeMonitoring to true, and correlate any abused municipal hostname with executable downloads or payment-system access. Block unapproved RMM tools, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, rotate exposed pipeline, cloud and mTLS credentials, segment SMB and RDP, and require 802.1X on branch ports. Verification should connect initial access, credential theft, tunneling or persistence, and payment-application activity. The expected result is that every matching host and identity has a disposition and no unexplained transactions continue after containment.