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C2Looper Backdoor Uses GitHub to Control Infected Windows PCs

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What a defender needs to know

Zscaler ThreatLabz identified two variants of the Rust-based C2Looper backdoor. The older build posts host identity to /api/beacon every second, runs commands, and can place wtsapi32.dll in %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\OneDrive\ for loading by the legitimate OneDrive executable. Researchers observed the older build use that command to retrieve the newer one.

Version 2 moves command-and-control into an abused GitHub repository. Per-bot directories use cmd.json, result.json, and beacon.json for commands, output, and liveness. The malware can enumerate files, run domain reconnaissance, list drives, execute payloads, and inject shellcode into the text section of winspool.drv. Zscaler did not quantify victims and rates ClickFix delivery and ransomware linkage as assessments.

Search for the three published hashes; 45[.]158[.]196[.]23:8888; 45[.]158[.]196[.]184:8888; %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\OneDrive\wtsapi32.dll; %LocalAppData%\pld.exe; c2_out.txt; !!! v2 !!! pongv2 from; /api/beacon; /api/result/BOT_ID/task_ID; and bot-like access to cmd.json, result.json, or beacon.json. Correlate hits with OneDrive termination and DLL loading, cmd.exe, ShellExecuteW, ipconfig network queries and whoami privilege queries (each using the separate option /all), nltest domain-controller queries (option /dclist), domain-group discovery, wmic product-name and version queries, and access to winspool.drv.

The expected clean result is no hash or C2 match, no unexplained DLL load from the local OneDrive directory, and no repeated GitHub JSON exchange from a non-development process. Confirmed execution or command exchange warrants isolation and review of any secondary payloads.

Primary sources