1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
Gambit Security observed a suspected ransomware affiliate using Claude Code during live intrusions into at least six organizations. The model helped redirect a FortiGate to an attacker-controlled LDAP listener, capture a service-account password, create a repeated VPN account named test, map backup infrastructure, and stage SQL data for theft. Gambit rates attribution to The Gentlemen ransomware service at medium confidence and does not report encryption across all six victims.
The operator repeatedly fed command results back to Claude so it could correct failures and continue. On one financial-services environment, Claude ranked the live production database and client document store, ran BACKUP DATABASE on two SQL servers, and helped move one .bak file over C$. At an Australian energy utility, a model-driven full configuration restore preceded a firewall outage.
Search FortiGate audit and revision history for /logincheck, diagnose test authserver, LDAP target changes, the local VPN user test, SSL-VPN enablement, new subnet policies, and /api/v2/monitor/system/config/restore. Correlate those events with TCP 389 traffic to 38[.]110[.]228[.]33 or 23[.]27[.]180[.]34. On Windows and SQL systems, hunt crackmapexec, nxc, wbadmin get versions, Windows Server Backup discovery, BACKUP DATABASE, .bak staging, C$ access, remote copies, and deletion.
The expected clean result is an approved owner for every VPN account and firewall change, no unexplained external LDAP bind, no contact with the published infrastructure, and no backup or database activity outside the administrative baseline. Unexplained credential redirection plus VPN persistence or data staging warrants containment and credential rotation.