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What a defender needs to know
An attacker added unauthorized servers to the pool behind Coder’s legitimate registry.coder.com module registry. From 07:35 through 21:45 UTC on August 31, some requests received altered Terraform modules that searched provisioner environments for cloud, CI/CD, AI-tooling, OIDC, SSH, external-auth, database, and configuration credentials. Coder did not quantify how many deployments received them.
Exposure required a module fetch during that window. Check template imports, template updates, dry runs, and workspace creation with module caching disabled. Run Coder’s published SQL queries and search provisioner logs for data.external.telemetry. Correlate potential downloads with execution evidence.
Review firewall, proxy, DNS, and VPC flow logs for coder-infra[.]com and 199[.]91[.]220[.]205. A matching cache record establishes arrival; a log marker or outbound connection better establishes execution. Preserve those original records securely before clearing affected cached modules.
Upgrade to 2.37.0, 2.36.4, 2.35.7, or 2.34.9 after purging the cache. Rotate every credential available to an affected provisioner, including Coder database and configuration secrets when the provisioner ran inside coderd. Clean retrieval paths prevent recurrence; replaced identities remove the value of secrets that may already have been copied.