1-minute read of a 5 min report

DOUBLECUP Hides a ClickFix Payload in the Browser Cache

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

SOCRadar documented DOUBLECUP, a loader service that places a malicious PNG in a visitor’s browser cache before showing a fake CAPTCHA. The page retrieves browser-specific campaign settings, preloads the image, and copies a command to the clipboard. The visitor must paste and run that command. It searches the cache by the PNG’s exact size, uses findstr or certutil to recover a hidden first stage, and starts a fileless dropper.

The dropper derives a decryption key from the victim’s public IPv4 address, checks the final payload against a hardcoded SHA-256 value, and runs CountLoader or DeviceManager in memory. CountLoader supports Windows and macOS, can establish persistence, and retrieves additional payloads. DeviceManager uses Ethereum or Polygon smart contracts to resolve command infrastructure and can communicate through HTTP or DNS. SOCRadar did not establish how many visitors executed the chain.

Preserve browser history, cache entries, the PNG, page scripts, and configuration and session requests. Correlate the visit with shell, PowerShell, findstr, or certutil command lines reading browser-cache paths, then check scheduled-task or LaunchAgent persistence, DNS A and TXT traffic, public-IP lookups, and follow-on Python, MSI, DLL, archive, or script execution.

Classify the event as cache-only only when browser, process, file, and network records show that no pasted command or extracted stage ran. If the command ran, isolate the endpoint, account for the full process tree and exposed credentials, remove persistence, and restore the system to a trusted state. Missing cache, command-line, or DNS telemetry leaves execution unresolved.

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