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Windows 11 RAM Attack Lets Admins Disable Defender and VBS

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What a defender needs to know

USENIX researchers demonstrated Download More RAM, a software-only memory-aliasing attack against Windows 11 systems with writable DIMM configuration blocks. A local administrator changes SPD geometry so the module reports twice its real capacity. The invented upper addresses point to protected physical memory, allowing the attacker to patch secure-kernel code integrity, disable Defender or EDR, and re-enable blocked vulnerable drivers.

The research started with administrator access and did not establish exploitation in the wild. It tested selected DDR4 and DDR5 modules rather than every product line. Microsoft assigned CVE-2026-23670 and shipped a partial mitigation in the April 14, 2026 security update. Updated systems with Secure Boot silently ignore the removememory parameter used to stabilize the published chain. The paper says systems without Secure Boot remain affected and another stabilization method could restore the chain.

Verify that each Windows 11 endpoint runs the April 14 cumulative update or later and that elevated PowerShell returns True for Confirm-SecureBootUEFI. Minimum builds are 28000.1836 for 26H1, 26200.8246 for 25H2, 26100.8246 for 24H2, and 22631.6936 for 23H2; later cumulative builds supersede them. Inventory specific DIMM part numbers and SPD write-protection state on every endpoint where administrators are constrained by VBS.

Hunt for unexpected memory-capacity changes, boot-configuration edits, a restart followed by RAM-disk activity, SPD access through SMBus-capable drivers, and attempts to load blocked drivers. A current build, Secure Boot enabled, stable memory inventory, and no unexplained SPD-to-driver sequence is the expected verification result.

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