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Dysphoria Compromised 296,000 IoT Devices for DDoS and Proxy Abuse

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What a defender needs to know

Shadowserver distributed a one-time report covering about 296,000 IoT devices compromised by the Dysphoria botnet. The dataset is retrospective: its timestamp is the August 12 distribution time, while last_seen_time records the final observation available for a row. It does not prove that every listed device remains infected.

CNCERT and XLab describe two Dysphoria roles. DDoS samples receive attack commands. Relay-only samples use UPnP to map 155 ports and forward traffic through compromised routers, gateways, cameras, and other embedded Linux systems. Both roles can masquerade as libdalvikengine.so; XLab also published protocol magics, hashes, infrastructure, a /nodes?key=meowmeowmeow request path, and a distinctive FTP banner for hunting.

Map each Shadowserver row to a specific device using the public IP, port, last_seen_time, model fields, and local DHCP, NAT, firewall, and authentication records. Preserve evidence before recovery. Reset the device through a trusted vendor method, install the current supported firmware for that model, rotate credentials, remove unnecessary Telnet and SSH exposure, disable unnecessary UPnP mappings, and restrict outbound traffic.

Verify three things: the inventory records the intended supported build and fresh credentials; the gateway has no unexpected mapped ports; network telemetry shows no recurring 78-byte Dysphoria messages, /nodes?key=meowmeowmeow requests, or traffic to the published infrastructure. Shadowserver says newly subscribed network owners can request recent special reports at no cost.

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