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XLab Traces 200,000-Device Dysphoria Botnet to UPnP Relays

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

QiAnXin XLab estimates that Dysphoria controls roughly 200,000 devices after comparing July monitoring with the botnet’s control panel. Its July 25 report separates the family into DDoS samples and a relay-only variant. The estimate is a researcher assessment, and the operator’s 4 Tbps capacity claim was not independently measured.

The relay sample asks a local UPnP gateway to map 155 inbound ports to the infected device. Each listener then opens an outbound connection to the same port on the real remote server and binds the traffic in both directions with Linux epoll. The device also reports status to login.trees4sale.net:9000. Other Dysphoria samples use ENS and SNS records to find distribution nodes that return additional compromised relays.

Export gateway UPnP and NAT tables, investigate devices with a large block of unexplained mappings, and check the mapped host for a libdalvikengine.so process, many listeners, same-port outbound sessions and XLab’s domains, IP addresses and hashes. Remove unauthorized mappings, disable unneeded UPnP and remote administration, replace weak credentials, patch applicable flaws, and install a trusted supported image.

Use an external scan to confirm the mapped ports are gone. Verify the device’s trusted image and unique credentials, and check DNS and flows for further Dysphoria infrastructure or relay traffic. Missing gateway history or a trusted firmware baseline prevents confident closure.

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