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Fire Ant Hijacks Cisco Routers to Steal Credentials and Erase Evidence

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What a defender needs to know

Fire Ant hid an operational GRE tunnel on a Cisco IOS XR router whose running configuration and commit history did not explain it. Sygnia traced the path into TACACS authentication and Linux management systems, where the actor captured credentials, planted durable backdoors, suppressed logs, and altered the evidence defenders would normally trust.

The router toolset persisted through /etc/rc.d/init.d/grub-rommon, ran /usr/bin/acpid, and used /pkg/bin/hd to filter command output. TacTap loaded /lib/libseconfd.so through /usr/sbin/acppid and wrote captured credentials to /var/log/.tacplus.acct. BridgeAgent persisted as zabbix_agent.service with configuration at /opt/.ICEauthority; another backdoor used /var/tmp/ping and the trigger string sxcdewqaz!@#.

Inventory every IOS XR router, TACACS server, VMware system, Linux jump host, and monitoring server in the shared administrative path. Preserve memory and live network state. Compare operational GRE interfaces, process library maps, persistent services, AAA records, packet flow, and configuration backups with records held outside the affected devices.

Verify that every live tunnel, privileged authentication, loaded library, service, and outbound path has a documented configuration and matching independent telemetry. The expected result is full agreement across router, TACACS, Linux, hypervisor, collector, and network evidence. A mismatch remains an incident lead because Fire Ant manipulated device-local logs and command output.

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