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Unit 42 Extracted the Master Key Protecting Google's Synced Passkeys

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What a defender needs to know

Unit 42 demonstrated three post-compromise paths against Google Password Manager’s synced passkeys in Chrome on Windows systems with a TPM. Malware running as the user can inventory passkey records, reuse the endpoint’s wrapped identity key to obtain an assertion without a PIN or biometric prompt, force re-enrollment and substitute an attacker-controlled verification key, or recover the security domain secret from Chrome memory during device recovery.

The research does not break WebAuthn cryptography and does not describe active exploitation. It gives no affected Chrome-version range or complete remediation status. eBay fixed a UV-validation gap, and Google removed the master secret from FIDO logs, but Unit 42 says the secret still enters Chrome memory and public documentation does not define a self-service way to rotate it.

Preserve the affected Chrome profile, Sync Data\LevelDB, passkey_enclave_state, Chrome process telemetry, and modification events for passkey state. Correlate unexpected Password Manager PIN or onboarding prompts with process access to Chrome memory, Windows cryptographic activity, and authentication from new devices or locations.

Relying parties should require user verification and reject assertions without the UV bit. After endpoint compromise, revoke sessions, review enrolled devices and authenticators, and re-establish access from a clean system. Verify that the endpoint is trusted, enrollment changes are explained, and no unexplained authentication remains. An update or PIN change alone does not establish that a copied master secret was invalidated.

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