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GPUStack loopback trust grants remote requests administrator access

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

CISA added CVE-2026-102895 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9, with a November 12 deadline for covered federal agencies. GPUStack before 2.2.0 treated local-looking requests as its built-in administrator by default. The GPUStack maintainers say attackers exploited a 2.1.1 deployment and created inference backends that ran reverse shells.

The route into an exposed server can be a same-host reverse proxy: GPUStack sees the proxy’s loopback TCP connection even when the original client is remote. A client-controlled X-GPUStack-Real-IP header can also supply the loopback value 127.0.0.1. An administrator reached this way can mint persistent wildcard-scope API keys, change users or models, read worker and cloud-provider secrets, and add inference backends.

Locate GPUStack servers below 2.2.0 and trace their proxy and direct API exposure. Review available proxy and API records, administrator key creation, backend changes and worker activity; compare keys and backends with approved owners. Upgrade to 2.2.0 or later. Pending upgrade, set force_auth_localhost=true, strip client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP at the edge, and restrict API access through VPN or edge authentication. Afterward, test an unauthenticated management request through the normal proxy path: expect an authentication challenge, not administrator data. Revoke unexpected keys and investigate changed backends and exposed secrets separately.

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