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Huntress Blocks Known Attacker Ranges at Microsoft 365 Sign-In

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What a defender needs to know

Huntress launched Adversary Infrastructure for Managed ITDR on November 5. It says the service turns IP ranges identified in one tenant’s investigated Microsoft 365 compromise into campaign-labeled Conditional Access blocks in eligible opted-in tenants. Existing partners are opted out by default; new partners are opted in at onboarding. A tenant needs Entra ID P1 or P2, Security Defaults off and healthy Huntress onboarding for the blocking path. Tenants unable to run Conditional Access still get Huntress detections after sign-in.

This follows observed identity attacks. Huntress reports that a one-off block of Railway cloud ranges implicated in device-code phishing stopped 305 attempts without affecting legitimate logins in its validation window. It also reports 78 compromised accounts in an IPv6-range password spray; 55 had MFA policies, but ROPC legacy authentication bypassed the MFA prompt. These are Huntress’s own measurements of campaigns and its product response.

Opt in the intended existing tenants in ITDR settings, then check the [HUNTRESS] campaign policy and named location in each eligible Entra tenant. On a reported block, compare Huntress’s Low-severity incident identity, source and campaign with Microsoft’s sign-in result and applied policy. Expect the attempt to fail before a session is issued. Treat a report without a blocking policy as post-sign-in evidence. Separately test a device-code-flow block in report-only mode where that flow is unnecessary, then enable it with emergency-access exclusions preserved.

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