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What a defender needs to know
Mandiant’s September 24 guidance describes a release-path failure: a lower-trust pull request can write corrupted dependencies to a shared cache that a later production build reads. That build may run the dependency with publishing access. Mandiant also describes mutable action tags and compromised workflows producing packages with legitimate provenance; the signature follows the authorized build, including its inputs.
For platform teams, compare cache writers with release-job readers in workflow definitions and job logs. Separate caches by branch privilege and reject unauthenticated-fork writes. Keep untrusted checkouts out of privileged pull_request_target and workflow_run jobs, as GitHub advises. Pin third-party Actions to verified full commit SHAs, scope the release job’s GITHUB_TOKEN, and use fresh runners and short-lived publishing identities.
Mandiant recommends screening dependencies through an internal proxy and holding newly published public packages for seven days. npm CLI v11 supports min-release-age=7 in .npmrc; plan reviewed min-release-age-exclude exceptions for urgent patched packages, because the age rule can block npm audit fix.
A useful test runs an ordinary nonpublishing pull-request build, then checks that its cache cannot be restored by the protected release job and that it holds no publishing identity. Check that a new public package is held while an approved security exception is recorded. Trace the writer of each cache entry restored by a publisher, including on successful builds.