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What a defender needs to know
Storm-3068 took control of a user’s identity after a self-service password reset, registered its own authentication methods and used Azure DevOps to move toward Kubernetes resources. Microsoft says the attacker deployed a malicious pipeline authorized for more than 50 resources; investigators found seven stolen kubeconfig files committed to a repository. Those are resource permissions and stolen files, respectively, not a count of compromised clusters.
Correlate Entra reset and authentication-method events with Azure DevOps pipeline creation, edits and executions. Review Git history and pipeline job logs for kubeconfig collection, a kube agent, Atera installation and executed Chisel tunnel commands. Enable Log Audit Events in Azure DevOps Services where it is available, and export or stream the events if you need more than the 90-day retention window. Azure DevOps auditing does not include sign-ins, so use Entra logs for that part of the sequence.
Restrict pipeline creation, modification and execution rights. Scope build identities and service connections to the resources each deployment needs; put branch checks and approvals on cluster-bearing connections. If you find exposed kubeconfig material, revoke the attacker’s access and rotate the credentials before testing that an unapproved pipeline is denied the connection. Confirm the enabled audit log records a branch-policy change as a separate telemetry check. A rejected new run controls future access; Git history and cluster records still need investigation for earlier use.