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Attackers Stole Philippine Nuclear Records Through an Old ownCloud Flaw

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

Hunt.io found an attacker staging server containing scripts, transfer logs and files taken from a Philippine nuclear research body. The scripts exploited CVE-2023-49105 in ownCloud Server: when a known user had no signing key configured, the attacker could reproduce a pre-signed URL calculation with an empty secret and send WebDAV requests as that user.

The visible collection held 176 files totaling about 372 MB, including nuclear-material records, reactor data, employee information, BitLocker recovery keys and a KeePass database. An operator CSV referenced roughly 9 GB, although most of that larger set was absent from the directory Hunt.io inspected. The evidence supports a Chinese-speaking operator assessment, not a named-group or state attribution.

The historical staging address is 31[.]58[.]209[.]241:8000. Search value: multi_backupd with SHA-256 7447d0d0c34779d4c519823b39bf6ddc16d2b34a226b82ee69da6f5b4a77ad82; Hunt.io did not tie that loader directly to the ownCloud theft path.

Check every ownCloud Server for core 10.6.0 through 10.13.0 and move affected deployments to 10.13.1 or a later supported build carrying the fix. Verify a non-empty signing key for every active owner. Review proxy and WebDAV logs for /remote.php/dav/files/ requests containing OC-Credential, OC-Verb, OC-Expires, OC-Date and OC-Signature, then correlate PROPFIND with Depth: 1, later GET requests and one source moving across accounts. The expected result is zero reachable affected builds, no empty signing-key state and no unexplained accepted request sequence. A match expands response scope to every file and credential the impersonated account could reach.

Primary sources