1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
Researchers Alejandro Hernando and Borja Martínez demonstrated that crafted device identities can make a fully updated Windows 11 machine fetch signed vendor packages and run vulnerable installer code as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. A physical chain combines Sierra Wireless DNS control with a Sony FeliCa co-installer’s plaintext HTTP download and privileged path traversal. A remote chain lets a standard RDP user forge Intel RealSense descriptors through URBDRC and trigger a signed co-installer that loads C:\Intel\RSDCM\CRYPTBASE.dll from a user-writable directory as SYSTEM. The release kit reports research demonstrations, not malicious exploitation, and gives no victim or exposure count.
On RDP and VDI hosts that do not need device redirection, set both fDisablePNPRedir and fDisableUSBRedir to 1, refresh policy, then verify the server rejects a redirected test device. Enable DisableCoInstallers, but pair it with device-installation restrictions or hardware-ID allow lists; one package without a co-installer still ran as SYSTEM in the researchers’ test. Inventory Sierra Wireless, Sony FeliCa, Intel RealSense, Wacom and Qualcomm Atheros packages separately; remove unused software and apply current package-specific vendor updates. The source identifies no universal Windows fix.
Hunt for Sierra named-pipe activity followed by DNS changes, Sony installer downloads over HTTP, privileged co-installer writes into System32, execution under C:\Intel\RSDCM, a staged CRYPTBASE.dll, and SYSTEM module loads from user-writable paths. Preserve device-install, process, module-load, DNS, proxy and RDP session telemetry. The expected policy result is 1 for both registry values and rejection of the redirected test device. Those results block the demonstrated remote technique but do not establish whether vulnerable installer code executed earlier.