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What a defender needs to know
Huntress found 2,408 unauthorized ScreenConnect guest sessions enrolled since November 3 on at least 118 self-hosted servers across 109 Huntress-protected organizations. The machines use crypto-exchange names such as KUCOIN-SRV and trading-desktop thumbnails. A scripted emulator appears to keep these fake Access guests online. Huntress found no guest-side file transfer or command activity from them; it treats possible abuse of the separate technician-client flaw CVE-2026-84869 as a hypothesis.
If you run an MSP ScreenConnect server, preserve App_Data\Session.db, its WAL file and session history. Look for exchange-and-role names with empty company fields, claimed guest version 25.3.4.9288, ClientType 1 and an empty guest public key. Check which technicians joined; distinguish guest actions from technician actions before deleting confirmed fake sessions. Investigate possible credential exposure where a technician sent text, because ScreenConnect does not retain what was typed.
Update on-premises ScreenConnect and technician host clients to 26.6.5 or later, reinstall host clients and update Access agents. Check the installed client version in server history even for cloud-hosted servers. Until the update is applied, ConnectWise directs operators to remove TransferFiles from assigned session groups under Administration > Security > Roles. If an unpatched technician client joined a suspect session, inspect its process history and ScreenConnect Temp and Startup folders. Confirm cleanup in a fresh session list and confirm technician client versions after the update.