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Attackers Push Rogue ScreenConnect Clients to Hundreds of Managed Endpoints

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

Huntress observed ScreenConnect panel commands install rogue remote clients on at least 288 hosts across 48 organizations on November 11; another wave on November 13 hit 205 hosts across 41 organizations. The counts describe separate waves. ConnectWise had not identified the initial access route in its November 11 advisory; Huntress later linked panel commands to RMM+. RMM+ extension versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank RMMPlus.AccessKey when an administrator had never set one, bypassing ordinary console sign-in, roles and MFA. Huntress saw RMM+-linked commands without matching technician logins.

On hosted panels, ConnectWise disabled five related third-party extensions across more than 400 partner environments; operators of self-hosted panels should disable those extensions themselves. Review Run Command and Toolbox history against approved work, then inspect connected endpoints for a second ScreenConnect client, TrapWatch, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, and RelayTrapLiteAlert. Look for the later-wave installer host 185[.]241[.]211[.]197 and relay 007[.]from-ak[.]com. Isolate affected machines and use an out-of-band CLI from a clean device; a ScreenConnect session to a suspect host can expose a technician workstation. Revoke potentially exposed sessions and credentials and remove rogue persistence while preserving the legitimate client.

Huntress found the kit designed for a technician-workstation jump but reported unsuccessful console-takeover attempts in recovered logs. Update technician clients to 26.6.5 or later for the separate client flaw CVE-2026-84869; current server versions were affected by the RMM+ path. Before restoring access, verify the extension is disabled, the rogue service and task are removed, and panel activity matches approved work. Watch for reinfection when isolation ends.

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