1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
Confiant documented a SourTrade malvertising chain that makes the victim’s browser build a Windows executable. A SharedWorker requests /config, fetches a clean Bun runtime, generates session-specific bytes with AES-CTR, and combines those inputs with delivered PE sections and malicious JavaScriptCore bytecode. A ServiceWorker then serves the completed stream through a same-origin download URL. Rotating values can produce a different file hash for each session.
The campaign impersonates TradingView, Solana, and Luno and uses visitor fingerprinting to show selected targets a lure while analysts and bots may receive a blank page. The user must still download and run the assembled file. Confiant did not identify the payload family in the samples covered by its July report.
Preserve browser history, ServiceWorker storage, cached scripts, the /config response, proxy and DNS records, the downloaded file, its Zone.Identifier, and endpoint process telemetry. Correlate the landing-page visit with the runtime download and the file’s creation and execution. One missed hash does not clear the host because output can vary by session.
Block software downloads from paid search or lookalike domains and allow TradingView applications only from the vendor’s site or official app stores. Classify an event as no download or execution only when records show that no assembled file was saved or run. If it ran, account for the file, its process tree, and follow-on activity, then restore the endpoint to a trusted state. Missing browser, proxy, or process history leaves the incident unresolved.