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Storm-3168 Deletes Azure Storage Accounts With Stolen Service Principals

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What a defender needs to know

Two compromised Azure service principals split discovery and destruction in one tenant, according to Microsoft Security Research. One made more than 300 successful read operations over roughly 15 hours and 30 minutes. The other enumerated two subscriptions in five seconds, then attempted more than 100 storage-account deletions in a seven-minute burst. Most targeted accounts were deleted. It later made more than 30 successful ListKeys requests, including for storage accounts related to Azure Site Recovery.

Group-granted Storage Account Contributor and direct Contributor assignments gave the destructive identity its reach. SQL deletion attempts failed on an unsupported API version; locks and storage-account deletion protection stopped some storage deletions. Microsoft associates 45.131.66[.]106 with malicious ARM requests and App Service probing, and 34.153.223[.]102 and 64.20.53[.]230 with App Service probing. Relate hits to principal IDs and operation results before treating them as this tenant’s deletion activity.

Trace Azure Resource Manager reads, storage and lock deletion attempts, and ListKeys by principal and time. Revoke or rotate exposed workload secrets, review Storage Account Contributor and Contributor assignments, and verify CanNotDelete locks on critical recovery resources using Azure’s Locks view or az lock list --resource-group <resource-group>. In a disposable locked scope, a management-plane deletion should fail. Locks protect account resources; investigate data-plane access and rotate retrieved account keys with dependent application owners. Microsoft found a service-principal secret in a public GitHub issue’s edit history but could not confirm its use in this attack. Rotate the exposed principal secret anyway.

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