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Fake Microsoft Teams Support Calls Plant Persistent Node.js Backdoors

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1-minute read

What a defender needs to know

Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed attackers impersonating IT support through external Microsoft Teams chats and calls. After persuading a user to approve remote control, an operator used PowerShell and Windows Installer (msiexec, with the separate quiet flag /qn) to install a malicious MSI, staged a portable Node.js runtime and encrypted JavaScript implant under LocalAppData, and persisted through an EdgeUpdate Run value or Startup shortcut.

The implant supported command execution, reconnaissance, screen capture, and later payloads. Microsoft saw WinRM movement toward domain controllers and certificate authorities at :5985/wsman. It did not quantify the campaign or report completed theft, extortion, ransomware, or domain takeover. Teams itself was not exploited; the operator persuaded users to cross external-contact warnings.

Correlate external Teams contacts with remote-support activity, PowerShell-created MSI files, WScript launching Node.js from AppData\Local, EdgeUpdate persistence, and user-context WinRM. One published MSI hash is 4cfdcae6dd1d6d98b870c8f0654d504f2bf10479a117dc297de789c249dc389d. The attacker abused the legitimate Azure Blob hostname updatetmp[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net; a hardcoded C2 was synctimes[.]australiaeast[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com.

Require a known internal channel to authenticate support requests, restrict external Teams access where feasible, control approved RMM tools, and limit WinRM to management systems. For a seven-day hunt, the expected clean result is no external-support contact followed by remote control, MSI staging, Node.js execution, EdgeUpdate persistence, or WinRM movement. Isolate connected hits, preserve the chain, and rotate credentials reachable from the affected host.

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