1-minute read
What a defender needs to know
Cisco Talos reports that UAT-11587 targeted government and policy organizations across Asia and identified about 350 compromised endpoints in eight countries by July 2026. Its Antino Windows backdoor reaches graph.microsoft.com to use the actor’s Outlook mailbox for commands and OneDrive for heartbeats and file transfer. Talos counts at least 10 confirmed and five probable affected institutional environments, plus an intended target.
One recurring entry route was a forged Gmail attachment card linking to a Cloudflare Pages HTA. The chain ran JScript through mshta.exe, loaded a .NET downloader, and launched signed GatherOsState.exe beside malicious slc.dll. In mail review, distinguish SPF authorization for the envelope domain osc-cdn[.]com from DMARC alignment with the impersonated From header. In endpoint logs, correlate the script-host launch with the signed-binary/DLL pair, %LOCALAPPDATA%\Windows GatherOSStateKit\, an HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run change or sdiagnhost.exe running result.ps1 from C:\Windows\Temp\SDIAG_<GUID>.
Restrict downloaded HTA and WSF execution on workstations where those formats have no approved role; validate the policy with a safe internal test. Review DMARC failures and move domains you own toward enforcement after legitimate-sender validation. For a matching host, isolate and investigate it, remove the implant and persistence through incident response, then verify that the files and Run entry are gone and its process-linked Microsoft Graph connection pattern has stopped. Correlate Graph traffic with the suspect Windows process chain; leave the shared Microsoft hostnames available to legitimate applications.