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What a defender needs to know
VulnCheck found two undocumented root-level implants in MoreQuick MQWrt firmware used by ZBT and white-label cellular routers. DARKLANTERN runs as infosrvd and listens on UDP/9992, which the stock firewall opens to the WAN. SPEAKINGSTONE runs as yunmgrd, sends UDP/10000 beacons to a configured server, and accepts unauthenticated commands for root execution, PPPoE credential theft, DNS changes and reverse SSH.
The researchers identified 203 internet-facing DARKLANTERN responders across 22 countries and received 392 SPEAKINGSTONE beacons after sinkholing its forgotten backup domain. The responder count and beacon count are separate, incomplete measurements. The research does not show that every ZBT-derived or white-label model carries an implant, and MOFI’s custom firmware image was clean.
Search asset and procurement records for the observed ZBT platforms, then inspect process and firmware evidence for infosrvd and yunmgrd. Hunt inbound UDP/9992, replies to UDP/8897 and outbound UDP/10000. The primary SPEAKINGSTONE command domain is www[.]ac-link[.]com; www.findmyipaddr.com is now VulnCheck’s defensive sinkhole.
Isolate a matching device and verify it with VulnCheck’s firmware rules or authorized read-only DARKLANTERN probe. Preserve the router image and relevant network history before replacement. A vulnerable probe result returns the expected identification bytes and device fields on UDP/8897. No reliable fixed firmware is known, so replacement or a rebuild from independently verified firmware is the recovery condition.