An attacker used credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to enter customer cloud accounts and download S3 data, according to Wiz Research’s November 9 investigation. The affected organizations had granted that vendor account permission to assume integration roles in their own AWS accounts. Wiz observed the activity from October 14 through October 26, including successful role assumptions, access to secrets and credential testing. In some environments, the attacker downloaded whole S3 buckets.
The intrusion started at a trust relationship customers had already approved. An integration role could be idle for months and still admit a caller from the trusted account. Wiz says most roles the attacker assumed were otherwise unused; in a majority of its observed environments, the malicious requests were the only role-assumption traffic from that vendor account in October. That makes dormant vendor access worth finding before the next call arrives.
One vendor account, several doors
An AWS integration typically asks a customer to create an IAM role that trusts the vendor’s AWS account. The vendor presents the role ARN and an external ID to sts:AssumeRole, receiving temporary credentials with the permissions the customer gave the role. AWS’s IAM guidance explains that an external ID helps prevent a confused-deputy problem; AWS states, “AWS does not treat the external ID as a secret.” It cannot distinguish an authorized vendor process from an attacker who can use an allowed identity in that account and supply the ID.
Wiz identified source account 805246085872, which it also saw Qubole’s platform use legitimately. The first malicious session it observed, on October 14, came through a Mullvad VPN exit at 45.83.220.211 using IAM principal ID AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS. Most activity after October 15 came from an OVH-hosted address, 57.129.54[.]120. From October 18, the attacker also used principal ID AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW, which carried legitimate platform traffic from AWS infrastructure. Every role assumption Wiz attributed to this actor supplied an external ID and succeeded.
The account ID by itself is therefore a starting point, not a compromise verdict. The source network and principal ID separate suspect traffic from the integration’s normal use. Wiz described the attacker-only principal as one it saw solely in this activity; its second principal needs the non-AWS source-network condition.
Secrets and objects behind the role
Once inside, the attacker listed cloud resources and sought credentials through Lambda configuration’s GetFunctionConfiguration, Secrets Manager’s ListSecrets and GetSecretValue, and SSM Parameter Store’s DescribeParameters and GetParameter. Wiz observed TruffleHog testing discovered AWS keys with GetCallerIdentity, and testing Entra ID service-principal and Okta client credentials. Those were credentials belonging to affected customers, not Qubole.
For S3, Wiz traced a progression from ListBuckets to ListObjects and HeadObject, followed by GetObject downloads. AWS’s CloudTrail data-event documentation classifies GetObject as an S3 object-level data event and says trails do not record data events by default. Management events may reveal the session and listing while leaving the downloaded object names out of the record. Enable S3 object data events on sensitive buckets, or retain S3 server access logs; data-event logging has an AWS charge.
Wiz also found an sso_agent.iso image, SHA-256 65f061281c9a712e9502793dc4c5035cae490b84da05f7d4223cefa65ad396e4, hosted at the OVH address. Its analysis describes a bootable image that gathers host and disk information, polls TCP port 23458 for shell-script input, and reboots after 90 minutes. Wiz found no deployment of that image, so investigate a matching host artifact separately from the confirmed AWS role sessions. Wiz also described an October 8–11 incident involving customer-owned keys created for Qubole integrations and could not link that activity to these vendor-account role assumptions.
Hunt the sessions, then remove trust
Search CloudTrail across accounts holding Qubole integration roles, from October 1 onward. Look for AssumeRole where userIdentity.accountId is 805246085872 and sourceIPAddress lies outside AWS infrastructure, or where userIdentity.principalId is AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS. For AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW, require the non-AWS source-address condition. The attacker’s role-session prefix was quiam-; observed names include quiam-enum and quiam-scope-full. Pivot from a matching session to GetSecretValue, GetParameter, GetFunctionConfiguration and S3 object events in that session.
Wiz’s network indicators are 57.129.54[.]120, 2001:41d0:70d[:]7800:: (IPv6), 45.83.220.211, 185.209.199.73 and 89.37.63.175. The Mullvad exits are shared infrastructure: pair an IP match with account, session, principal and event context. Also inspect GetCallerIdentity with the TruffleHog user agent alongside one of those addresses, and check Entra ID and Okta sign-ins for that user agent. Wiz recorded additional user agents Boto3/1.37.9 md/Botocore#1.37.9 ua/2.1 os/linux#6.12.111+deb13-amd64 md/arch#x86_64 lang/python#3.13.5, aws-cli/2.37.12 md/awscrt#0.37.0 ua/2.1 os/linux#6.12.111+deb13-amd64 md/arch#x86_64 lang/python#3.14.6, Boto3/1.43.108 md/Botocore#1.43.108 ua/2.1 os/linux#6.1.0-53-arm64 md/arch#aarch64 lang/python#3.11.2 and Boto3/1.43.113 md/Botocore#1.43.113 ua/2.1 os/linux#7.0.0-38-generic md/arch#x86_64 lang/python#3.12.3; use these with the identity or network evidence, since common tooling can produce similar strings.
Remove idle roles and revoke sessions
Inventory IAM roles whose trust policies allow the Qubole-associated account, then remove trust for integrations your organization no longer uses. For integrations still required, reduce the role’s reach to needed resources and actions. Where Qubole supports it, pin the trust policy to a specific vendor IAM principal and documented source IP ranges or VPC endpoints. Wiz assessed that an aws:SourceIp condition would have blocked the role assumptions it observed. Coordinate external-ID rotation with the vendor, using distinct values per role where supported; keep the network and identity restrictions as the actual additional barriers.
For a suspect session, review the role’s reachable Lambda configuration, Secrets Manager entries, SSM parameters and S3 objects. Rotate readable credentials and revoke active sessions for that role: a credential rotation alone leaves already issued temporary sessions alive. Confirm the unwanted trust has been removed, that required integration traffic still arrives from approved vendor identities and networks, and that a new S3 GetObject test on a sensitive test object appears in the chosen object-level log. Where object logging was absent during the intrusion window, investigate bucket contents and role reach as possible exposure even if management logs show only listing.