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What a defender needs to know
An attacker used a Qubole-associated AWS account to assume customer integration roles and download S3 data, according to Wiz Research’s November 9 investigation. Wiz observed successful role assumptions from October 14 through October 26, along with access to Lambda configuration, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store. The attacker tested discovered AWS, Entra ID and Okta credentials. Some sessions downloaded whole S3 buckets.
Find IAM roles that trust AWS account 805246085872. Search CloudTrail from October 1 for its AssumeRole events from non-AWS networks and for principal ID AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS; pair principal AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW with a non-AWS source address because it also carries normal traffic. Pivot by role session into GetSecretValue, GetParameter, GetFunctionConfiguration and S3 object reads. The attacker’s quiam- session prefix and 57.129.54[.]120 are useful corroborators. Shared VPN exit addresses alone need more context.
Remove dormant Qubole integration-role trust. For roles still in use, narrow permissions and, where supported, pin the vendor principal and approved source networks. Rotate credentials the role could read and revoke existing role sessions. Enable CloudTrail S3 data events or S3 server access logs for sensitive buckets: management events alone omit GetObject downloads. Verify that allowed integration sessions still work and a test object read appears in the object-level log.
